According to experts, the discovery that a North Korean missile fired by Russia in Ukraine contained a large number of parts from U.S.-based companies highlights the challenges of enforcing sanctions against Pyongyang. However, it could also help in uncovering illicit procurement networks.
Conflict Armament Research (CAR), based in the UK, analyzed the remnants of a North Korean ballistic missile used by Russia against Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv on Jan. 2.
In a report released this week, CAR found that many components of the missile’s navigation system were recently manufactured and bore the marks of companies based in the United States. Specifically, 75% of the components were linked to U.S. companies, 16% to European companies, and 11% to companies in Asia.
The date codes on the components indicated that over three quarters were produced between 2021 and 2023, and the missile could not have been assembled before March last year.
Despite international efforts to restrict North Korea’s access to parts and funding for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, sanctions experts were not surprised by the findings. CAR’s report highlighted the challenges in controlling the export of commercial electronic components and how reliant countries like North Korea, Russia, and Iran are on imported technology.
Anthony Ruggiero of Washington’s Foundation for Defense of Democracies emphasized the need to enforce sanctions to make them effective, stressing the importance of continually updating sanctions lists and investing in enforcement efforts.
CAR said it was collaborating with industry to trace the missile components and identify the entities responsible for their diversion to North Korea, but did not identify the specific companies linked to their production.
Martyn Williams of 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea project, noted that many components made by U.S. firms were easily available online and from electronics markets around the world. He also highlighted the availability of more specialized components in missiles as a concern.
The bulk of the components shown in a photo in the CAR report appeared to be widely available commercial items, according to Katsu Furukawa, a former member of the U.N. Panel of Experts. However, he also mentioned that in past U.N. investigations, specific items like pressure transmitters and flight control computers helped track procurement routes and identify perpetrators.
Jenny Town, director of 38 North, added that specialized items typically have more of a procurement paper trail and are obtained from a small number of vendors.
The U.S. State Department stated that they utilize export controls, sanctions, and law enforcement actions to prevent North Korea from acquiring technology for its weapons programs, and to prevent Russia from obtaining such weapons. They also work closely with the U.S. private sector, as well as foreign allies, in these efforts.
(Reporting by David Brunnstrom; Editing by Don Durfee and Daniel Wallis)
