WHEN a photo was released of former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, cane in hand, visiting current President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, one caption in a social media chat naughtily read, “The Ambassador of China presents his credentials to the President of the Philippines”.
What the President has done is to try to smooth over the provocation that was Duterte’s unannounced Beijing visit in July. But as his haggard demeanour reveals, the President is hard-pressed to smooth over both Beijing’s behaviour and appease his domestic critics.
A couple of days ago Beijing followed up its water cannonading with a verbal blast accusing the Philippines of not sticking to a previous pledge to remove the Navy ship BRP Sierra Madre from the disputed shoal it has run aground on (claimed by some as a promise supposedly made by former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo before a state visit by former China president Hu Jintao).
For its part, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), which has already filed over 30 notes verbales this year alone protesting China’s behaviour, expressed dismay over the failure of the special communications line between Manila and Beijing, saying it went unanswered.
Jay Batongbacal, director of University of the Philippines’ Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, believes, “Hotlines with China are not for communication, they’re to make the other side more uncertain about escalation, to allow one’s own fears get them to back down. As far as China is concerned, the one who calls is the one who’s weak. Not answering shows who’s strong.”
An unhelpful suggestion was a grandstanding one from a Congressman who said the Philippines should “downgrade” the embassy and “order our unusually quiet and inactive ambassador there to return to Manila” so he can be replaced. I happen to think that Beijing is one of the capitals where the Philippine representative is vastly qualified to do a tough job, which is to keep Manila advised on Beijing’s moves. That is far more beneficial than Congressman-style grandstanding.
It would be well to understand, as the Prussian tactician Carl von Clausewitz would have recognised (“War,” he famously wrote, “is diplomacy by other means”), that the use of water cannon by China’s coast guard is part of that country’s “Gray Zone Tactics” playbook.
Stanford defence scholar Gaute Friis describes what this represents: “A water cannon is generally considered an antipersonnel, nonlethal weapon, used to stop, discourage, or punish an unwanted activity. The tactic consists of blasting another ship with a high-pressure water stream. It is a mainstay in South China Sea incidents, as it is one of the very few ways ships at sea can kinetically attack other vessels in a way that is unlikely to cause severe damage to materiel or personnel.”
The Philippines has a wealth of contacts and institutional memory when dealing with the Middle East or the West, but this simply isn’t the case for much of Asia.
As he prepared to embark on a state visit to China, the late former president Benigno S. Aquino III asked to meet the DFA’s resident expert on China. The best that could be produced was a mild-mannered young diplomat who headed the China desk. After being briefed, Aquino asked if there might be people with extensive knowledge of the politburo who could be consulted as resource persons. The suggestion was two longtime Beijing residents who were Filipino journalists: the late Chito Sta Romana and Jaime FlorCruz.
At the start of Duterte’s term, I was given the opportunity to meet and have a frank discussion with Sta Romana and was convinced his great experience was truly in the service of the country. That included a sober appreciation on his part that much of the real diplomacy was being conducted through informal channels, bypassing him and, thus, without the benefit of his input, much less advice.
When Sta Romana died in office, FlorCruz paid tribute in words that read as if they should be marching orders for the next ambassador, which, as it turned out, is precisely what FlorCruz ended up becoming. Sta Romana, he said, helped “steer the bilateral relations with calm and steady hands”, because “he knew China inside-out. He knew how things there worked – and why”.
In other words, “wolf warrior diplomacy” (ie, confrontational and combative) is not for the Philippines; the recent purge of the previous foreign minister of China, returning the position to its previous, much more hard-line, holder, also underscores China’s behaviour in recent days.
– Philippine Daily Inquirer/Asia News Network
Credit: The Star : News Feed
